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Introduction 
With the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), the European Union added a new mode of 
governance to existing policy-making instruments. Instead of introducing joint competen-
cies, the OMC consists of multilateral surveillance of national policies. Supporters of the 
OMC claim that it was developed to reconcile legitimacy with effectiveness since it takes 
into account the diversity of national welfare states while facilitating trans-border policy 
learning. In contrast, this paper seeks to show that EU member states mainly use soft law 
in response to substantive disagreements. This mirrors earlier developments of the OECD 
and the IMF, where multilateral surveillance was also introduced to resolve deadlocks. In 
each case, member states opted for a non-binding procedural solution to overcome compet-
ing visions of the organizations’ purposes. Hence international organizations select soft 
law less for its effectiveness than for its capacity to foster compromises. Based on case 
studies, this paper juxtaposes the inauguration of soft coordination in the OECD, the IMF 
and the EU during the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s respectively. In all cases member states 
opted for soft law in times of ‘institutional crisis’ when more substantial agreements 
proved unattainable. As shown elsewhere, soft law policy coordination in the European 
Union shares many features with multilateral surveillance of the OECD and the IMF 
(Schäfer 2004). Hence we can obtain a broader view on why soft law was introduced to the 
EU by also looking at its origins in these organizations. 
A central argument of this paper is that existing approaches fail to convincingly explain the 
choice of soft law. They are much better at understanding harder forms of delegation and 
legal integration. Before we proceed, we have to clarify the notion of “soft law.” In gen-
eral, we use it if there are neither binding rules nor sanctions to enforce compliance. In 
terms of the concept of legalization (Abbott et al. 2000), soft law scores low both on obli-
gation and delegation but sometimes can be quite precise. More specifically, we stick to 
the following definition of soft law: 
“Rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally 
binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are 
aimed at and may produce practical effects”(Senden 2004: 112, emphasis deleted). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at possible theoretical explanations for 
the choice of soft law. Recent contributions in the principal-agent framework are a good 
starting point to trace the question when governments decide to delegate or pool sover-
eignty. Since delegation always goes along with agency losses – principals cannot com-
pletely control agents – governments shy away from it if there is policy conflict. Based on 
this insight, section 3 offers a historical reconstruction of the introduction of soft law, in   3
this case procedures of multilateral surveillance, in the OECD, the IMF, and the EU. Sec-
tion four concludes. 
 
1.  Soft Law: A Lacuna in Existing Theory 
The European Union employs a variety of coordination mechanisms in economic and so-
cial policy. They range from the centralization of policy-making authority in monetary pol-
icy to non-binding, soft coordination of national policies in social inclusion and pensions. 
Finally there is outright competition in some fields such as wages and corporate taxes. Yet 
existing approaches fail to properly explain this variation since they either (implicitly) 
adopt a functionalist view on policy coordination or do not deal with this question at all.
1 
In particular, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – uneasily situated between inte-
gration and subsidiarity – poses difficulties for most accounts as they better understand 
delegation than non-delegation. 
Most writing on the OMC does not enquire why governments chose soft coordination in 
employment policy (but see Goetschy 1999). Instead, the focus is on the way it is operated 
and its (potential) effects. The turn towards “Europeanization,” that is, the impact of the 
EU on the member states, has shifted attention away from integration, i.e. the choice for 
pooling or delegating sovereignty. Scholars have recently made more efforts to grasp the 
way the European polity functions. Since the governance approach does not aspire to ex-
plain the choice of different coordination devices, it has largely accepted the argument that 
soft coordination is the appropriate way to deal with member state diversity. National tradi-
tions in running the welfare state are diverse and any common prescription would fail to do 
justice to this heterogeneity. 
Yet this argument is ill-suited to explain the choice of soft law for two reasons. First, if we 
do not look at the European Employment Strategy (EES) in isolation but take into account 
the labor market recommendations of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, it becomes 
obvious that the EU does not confine itself to “governance by objectives.” On the contrary, 
these recommendations are not only specific but also resemble to a large extent those of 
the OECD (Dostal 2004). Second, national diversity may demand different solutions, yet it 
does not necessitate a refusal to commit governments. Content and form should be kept 
separate. In fact, we will see that the question of sanctions, delegation, and supranational 
                                                           
1 Functionalism explains the emergence of international institutions by their anticipated effects. 
Governments expect that permanent cooperation leads to better results than ad hoc negotiations 
(Keohane 1984: 88).   4
oversight has been contested between governments and the European Commission since 
1994. 
Neo-functionalist accounts do not face the same problem of neglect. On the contrary, the 
delegation of sovereignty to the European level constitutes the core of this research pro-
gram. Over the last years, a number of authors have tried to revitalize neo-functionalism. 
In particular, Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein have offered a transaction-based ac-
count of European integration. They contend that integration is a response to societal de-
mands for supranational rules. As cross-border transaction mount, societal actors (mainly, 
but not only, producers) call for common rules. In due course, governments accede to 
delegate competencies to the European level (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997; Fligstein/Stone 
Sweet 2002). Supranational actors have the task to make and enforce uniform market rules. 
Their actions, in turn, facilitate cross-border transactions that amplify demand for further 
supranational rules and centralized decision-making thus generating a self-reinforcing 
process. However, the neo-functionalist account seems less convincing for the choice of 
the OMC since soft law does not create any uniform rules or supranational competencies. 
Moreover, the EES can hardly be said to be a reaction to the mounting cross-border mobil-
ity of labor as a transaction-based approach would suggest. 
In a related argument, Burley and Mattli (1993: 50) suggest that the European Court of Jus-
tice safeguards member state compliance to prior agreements. As the legal system of the 
European Union is complex and provides plenty of opportunities to defect, an independent 
agent is best suited to monitor compliance. As a matter of fact, only supranational actors 
enable the member states to reap the benefits of cooperation. Thus it is rational not only to 
produce common rules but also to accept oversight and, in case of non-compliance, sanc-
tions. The same argument is frequently used to corroborate the need for an independent 
central bank. Only an insulated authority guarantees that no bail out of individual countries 
takes place if they fail to adhere to prudent fiscal policies (Issing 2002). Supranational ac-
tors prevent free riding and time inconsistent behavior of economic actors (Majone 1996; 
Bernhard/Broz/Clark 2002). Moreover, non-political decisions of autonomous agencies are 
supposed to provide superior solutions to technical problems. Hence an independent cen-
tral bank is the best means to fight inflation. Obviously, soft law does not measure up to 
any of these effects inherent to delegation. Why was it nonetheless chosen for employment 
policy? Neo-functionalism does not seem to offer a good answer. 
Moravcsik’s (1998: 36) intergovernmentalist theory champions the view that international 
cooperation is an attempt to arrange mutually beneficial policy coordination in the face of   5
negative external effects of unilateral actions. Delegation binds parties to negotiation out-
comes over time. In principle, precise rules could also credibly commit them but uncer-
tainty about the future makes contracts necessarily incomplete. Since governments cannot 
specify all possible contingencies in advance, they put supranational actors in charge of 
oversight and enforcement of their agreement (ibid: 73). From this point of view, soft law 
is largely futile because national labor market policies do not produce negative spill-overs. 
Therefore the introduction of the employment chapter to the Treaty of Amsterdam boils 
down to symbolic politics (Moravcsik/Niclolaidis 1999: 62). While Moravcsik and Nico-
laïdis note that there was a conflict between rich and poor member states and left and right 
parties in government, they do not elaborate on this point as they primarily want to explain 
to logic of delegation. However, this paper seeks to show that the choice for soft law has to 
be taken seriously as a way to resolve deadlocks that result from interest heterogeneity. 
The last three paragraphs could easily be rephrased in – and were in fact informed by – the 
principal-agent language. Pollack (1997; 2003) has most systematically spelled out this 
account of European integration. He argues that EU member states transfer power to the 
Commission, the Court and the Parliament in order to minimize transaction costs. The ra-
tionale for delegation includes all of the above mentioned functions: monitoring compli-
ance, filling in incomplete contracts, providing expert and credible regulation, and, in 
addition, setting the formal agenda for legislation (Pollack 2003: 25). In contrast to Mo-
ravcsik, however, Pollack claims that principals can never fully control agents and that the 
latter will exploit this leeway to advance integration. Agency loss, i.e. the degree of discre-
tion for supranational actors, is a function of uncertainty about future behavior and, accord-
ingly, the potential for defection among the principals. Another point is worth noting. 
Delegation is more likely if “the degree of [policy] conflict is low both among the princi-
pals and between principals and their agents” (ibid: 34). The next section seeks to show 
that governments shied away from delegating sovereignty when there were substantial dis-
agreements. Soft coordination was a way to overcome conflicting interests in the OECD, 
the IMF, and the European Union. 
 
2.  Procedural Answers to Policy Conflicts: Multilateral Surveillance in International 
Organizations 
Why do governments choose soft law to deal jointly with problems rather than more bind-
ing forms of cooperation? In the EU context, it is commonly held that governments opted 
for the EES and later the OMC because soft coordination creates opportunities for delib-  6
eration, systematic comparisons, and learning (Zeitlin 2003: 5). Similar arguments have 
been made for the OECD (Aubrey 1967: 144) although recent research casts doubts on this 
organization’s effectiveness in influencing national policies (Armingeon/Beyeler 2004). 
Yet whatever effects we observe, they need not be the reason for the choice of a certain 
instrument. As the next parts of this paper seek to show, governments relied on soft law to 
overcome their disagreements in very different contexts. If substantive agreements are im-
possible or hard to attain, non-binding procedures become an option negotiators can draw 
on. Soft law may in due course turn into a more solid form of cooperation, foster its own 
dynamic or vanish but during negotiations its main virtue is to avoid deadlock. 
 
2.1. OECD: If you cannot bind governments, watch them! 
The first organization to introduce multilateral surveillance was the OECD. It began to 
monitor national economic policies with its inception in 1961. However, we even find an 
earlier version of surveillance already in its predecessor organization, the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). In 1947, when the U.S. government announced 
the increase in financial aid to postwar Europe with European Recovery Program (ERP) – 
better known as Marshall aid – it also called for permanent cooperation of the recipient 
states. France and Great Britain took the lead and organized an international conference in 
July 1947. At this Paris conference the participant governments decided to establish the 
OEEC (Milward 1982). The allocation of Marshall aid was the most important task for the 
organization but, more generally, it strove to facilitate European reconstruction and to in-
crease trade among the recipient states, which faced severe balance of payments difficul-
ties. Allocating the funds turned out to be an arduous task that did not foster a cooperative 
climate as the U.S. government had hoped but rather instigated prolonged haggling be-
tween national administrations (see Schelling 1955). However, in due course the OEEC 
managed to liberalize trade among European states. 
The most successful part of the OEEC was the European Payments Union (EPU) created in 
July 1950. The EPU operated a clearing mechanism that allowed settling debts and credits 
among all member states, finally moving away from bilateral clearing that had hampered 
intra-European trade for the past years. Reviving trade helped closing the dollar gap and 
thus diminished the importance of protective import quotas. The OEEC states also sub-
scribed to a Code of Liberalization that outlined a stepwise reduction of import quotas and 
tariffs until 1955. Though there were at times difficulties, the EPU worked well and con-  7
tributed to the expansion of trade and European reconstruction in general (Asbeek Brusse 
1997). 
The European Payments Union is important because it first established member state sur-
veillance. If a member’s balance of payments deteriorated and threatened to exhaust the 
available credit, it was the task of the Managing Board to issue recommendations how to 
deal with the economic crisis without endangering the functioning of the EPU. Accord-
ingly, member states were obliged to transmit all required information about their eco-
nomic policies to the Managing Board. Early on, the EPU had to prove its effectiveness 
when, in the aftermath of an ambitious trade liberalization, West Germany’s balance of 
payments aggravated rapidly. To deal with such problems, the Managing Board established 
a number of steps that until today constitute the core of multilateral surveillance. First, it 
sent two experts on a mission to Germany who had to evaluate the economic situation and 
the appropriateness of the government’s actions. Second, it issued a number of policy rec-
ommendations that were meant to support the trade balance. Third, there was a hearing of 
government representatives and of the national central bank. The national delegation was 
required to appear at the meeting of the Managing Board for questioning, to comment on 
the experts’ report and to explain government policies (Eichengreen 1993: 32). However, 
what distinguished this early monitoring from later forms of multilateral surveillance was 
that the Managing Board had the authority to license short-term credits. Positive sanctions 
increased the incentive for national governments to comply. 
The achievements of the EPU were such that one of its architects anticipated in 1957 that it 
would soon fall prey to its successes (Triffin 1957: 208). Indeed, good times ended for the 
EPU and the OEEC in 1958. Most of its member states moved towards currency converti-
bility and the Treaty of Rome came into force establishing a new forum for political coop-
eration. Both events diminished the importance of the OEEC. First, with the main 
economic problems of Western Europe being solved, the IMF finally took up the role as-
signed to it 14 years earlier at Bretton Woods. In the same year, the European Payments 
Union was dissolved. Second, the OEEC members split into “the Six and the Seven” 
(Kitzinger 1960): Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 
joined the European Economic Community (EEC), whereas Austria, Denmark, Great Brit-
ain, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland formed the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA). The remaining OEEC countries, Greece, Ireland, Island, and Turkey, became 
members of neither organization. As a result, the OEEC needed a new purpose.   8
The split between the six and the seven reflected opposing approaches to European integra-
tion and also different economic interests. First, while the six supported pooling and dele-
gation of sovereignty and saw themselves on a road to political union, the seven favored 
intergovernmental forms of cooperation and a large free trade area. Second, the OEEC’s 
Code of Liberalization included the most favored nation rule among its members. Espe-
cially France hoped to get rid of this obligation and to weaken the British influence. Brit-
ain, in turn, saw the EEC states as discriminating against non-members. The U.S. had 
strongly supported closer European cooperation after the war, but now looked for a 
broader, transatlantic organization to be able to exert influence (Aubrey 1967: 22-23). 
Hence the OEEC members decided to reform the organization and in 1960 assigned the 
task to draft a proposal to the “Group of Four” (Wise Men).
2 
Distilling the views of the twenty governments involved in the discussion proved difficult. 
They disagreed on almost every aspect of the organization: (1) its competencies and the 
degree of legalization: voluntarism vs. obligation; (2) the scope of activities and the de-
marcation against the work of the EEC, the GATT, and the IMF; (3) a European or Atlan-
tic focus. While the United States and France favored a loose form of cooperation that did 
not infringe sovereignty, Switzerland and Sweden supported a stronger organization, in-
cluding some pooling and delegation. The EFTA states and the North American states 
wanted the new organization to deal with trade policy and discriminatory practices but the 
EEC members opposed any obligation that interfered with the move towards custom union. 
France wanted to do away with the Code of Liberalization; Germany preferred to keep it 
(Camps 1964: 268-273). 
In the light of these policy conflicts, a substantive agreement could not be achieved. In-
stead, the Wise Men had to look for compromises. One element that national governments 
could agree upon was to continue the consultation practice of the OEEC. However, without 
the Code of Liberalization there were no longer any binding goals involved and the eco-
nomic reviews would mainly serve to exchange opinions: 
“Under the annual review procedure each country submits its economic situation and poli-
cies to the examination of all its partners. Ample opportunity is thus provided for discussion 
of major problems, and each country is confronted with an informed view on the impact of 
its policies on its neighbours” (Burgess et al. 1960: 20). 
At the end, all governments could consent to use multilateral surveillance to coordinate 
economic policies. On December 14, 1960, they signed the Convention of the new Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development that came into force in 1961 (OECD 
                                                           
2 The four were Sir W. Randolph Burgess, Bernard Clappier, Paul Gore-Booth, and Xenophon Zolotas.   9
1960). Much of its goals were general and vague. The form of cooperation within the 
OECD was clearly intergovernmental and it did not produce any legislation. However, the 
OECD set the example for non-binding consultation procedures that Wallace (2000: 32) 
calls “OECD technique” in the EU context the. Hence, disagreements in substance do not 
end cooperation. National governments instead opt for procedural solutions. As we will see 
for the IMF and the EU, too, the choice of multilateral surveillance falls far short of bind-
ing law but it maintains cooperation. Although it cannot legally commit governments to 
prudent policies, it rests on moral suasion and peer pressure. Whatever it effects are, how-
ever, soft law often emerges as a way to overcome conflicting views in substance. 
 
2.2. IMF: adapting to changing circumstances 
The IMF introduced multilateral surveillance in response to a profound disagreement 
among its members on how to react to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of ad-
justable pegs. The IMF Articles of Agreement after the second amendment could barely 
hide that they were bridging opposing ideas about the international monetary system. The 
core controversy was between the proponents of fixed and floating exchange rates. 
Bretton Woods had envisioned a symmetrical exchange rate system where all currencies 
would be fixed against gold, but it quickly became a “fixed-rate Dollar standard” 
(McKinnon 1993: 15). This development had a direct impact on the question: who adjusts? 
In an N-country exchange rate system, only N-1 independent balance of payments instru-
ments are needed because if all states but one achieve an equilibrium in their trade bal-
ances, the Nth country will by implication also be in equilibrium (Mundell 1968: 195). 
With the Dollar standard, it was up to all countries but the U.S. to adjust. Adjustment 
rested on three instruments: the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policy. In turn, the U.S. 
ran a large trade deficit to ensure liquidity in the international monetary system and prom-
ised to convert foreign held Dollar reserves into gold. Moreover, since the U.S. virtually 
turned into the world’s central bank it had to pursue anti-inflationary policies to keep the 
exchange rate system stable. Figure 1 summarizes the de facto functioning of the Bretton 
Woods system.   10
Figure 1: The Dollar Standard, 1950-1971 
 
The system ran into problems when governments became unable (or unwilling) to use the 
adjustment mechanisms and U.S. inflation rose during the Vietnam War. Between 1948 
and 1967 there were only 15 changes in par values of the OEEC countries, none of those 
after 1961 (Horsefield/de Vries 1969: 116-121). Governments consciously tried to avoid 
exchange rate changes because of the effects on inflation, the price of imported goods, 
credibility of government policies and export opportunities. As long as unemployment and 
capital mobility were low, two internal adjustment mechanisms remained: fiscal and mone-
tary policy. Yet with rising (imported) inflation governments of surplus countries were less 
ready to utilize fiscal policy to stimulate the economy; and a restrictive fiscal policy meant 
rising unemployment of deficit countries. Greater capital mobility, on the other hand, in-
creased the costs of a loose monetary policy. Lower interest rates would not only stimulate 
investment but also cause capital flight – and the magnitude of the latter was on the rise. In 
short, adjustment mechanisms vital for the functioning of the Dollar standard soared during 
the 1960s. 
The mounting balance of payments deficits of the United States and the incapacitation of 
adjustment mechanisms undermined confidence in the system. This led to a convertibility 
crisis know as the “Triffin dilemma.” Due to continuous deficits, U.S. gold reserves de-
clined relative to outstanding dollar liabilities. During the sixties it became clear that the 
U.S. authorities could no longer cover those liabilities. Accordingly, after some turbulent 
years, the Bretton Woods system came to an end in 1971/73. U.S. inflationary policies and 
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a deep conflict over who should adjust dealt the final blow to a system that had grown in-
flexible (Bordo 1993: 80). 
The advent of floating exchange rates put pressure on the IMF since the Articles of Agree-
ment rested on the assumption of fixed exchange rates. Some of its most important mem-
bers openly violated IMF principles. Hence, after 1973, it was clear that the international 
monetary system had to be reformed. While the U.S. government demanded more flexibil-
ity, many European countries favored a return to fixed exchange rates with symmetric ad-
justment mechanisms. Ever since de Gaulle, France had objected to the privileged position 
of the United States in the international monetary system. The French government favored 
a return to a system based on fixed but adjustable par values
3 and considered floating rates 
“wrong and dangerous” (de Vries 1985a: 736). Accordingly the core controversy was on 
Article IV of the IMF charter, which defined fixed exchange rates as the guiding principle 
of the international monetary system. On March 14, 1975, the IMF presented its first pro-
posal for a revision of this article.
4 While maintaining the goal of fixed exchange rates, it 
accepted the possibility of floating rates under special circumstances. In addition, the IMF 
proposed to widen the margin of admissible par value fluctuations and to allow for preven-
tive exchange rate adjustments. Hence the system should be kept in principle but dealt with 
more flexibly. However, for differing reasons, both the French and the U.S. government 
rejected this proposal. 
The breakthrough was achieved later that year in November, during a summit of the heads 
of state and government of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United 
States at the Chateau de Rambouillet in France. The compromise tolerated flexible and 
fixed exchange rates but did not tie member states any longer to any one system.
5 The ne-
gotiators called for a “stable system of exchange rates” without defining this phrase pre-
cisely. In fact, France had demanded a “system of stable exchange rates.” While the new 
formulation could be associated with the hope for fixed exchange rate, it did not bind gov-
ernments (Pauly 1997: 104). Since it was not unambiguously clear which behavior would 
be compatible with a stable system of exchange rates, the IMF had the task to monitor 
                                                           
3 Provisions Regarding Par Values and Exchange Stability Under Article IV by the Executive Director for 
France, Jacques Wahl, April 9, 1975. Reprinted in de Vries (1985b: 296-297). 
4 Staff Draft of and Commentary on the Amendment of Article IV, March 14, 1975. Reprinted in de Vries 
(1985b: 287-295) 
5 The final formulation was as follows: “Under an international monetary system of the kind prevailing on 
January 1, 1976, exchange arrangements may include (i) the maintenance by a member of a value for its cur-
rency in terms of the special drawing right or another denominator, other than gold, selected by the member, 
or (ii) cooperative arrangements by which members maintain the value of their currencies in relation to the 
value of the currency or currencies of other members, or (iii) other exchange arrangements of a member’s 
choice.” IMF, Articles of Agreement, Article IV, Section 2b.   12
member states’ policies. More precisely, the Fund was asked to exercise “firm surveil-
lance” of their exchange rate policies (Article IV, Section 3a & b). It had to report on na-
tional policies which were then subject to discussion in the Executive Board. However, 
IMF member states introduced multilateral surveillance less for its alleged effectiveness 
but as an answer to the substantial disagreement over the shape of the international mone-
tary system. As the IMF historian observes: 
“It is clear from the record of the deliberations on the Second Amendment in the mid-1970s 
that the Fund’s governors did not agree on the precise meaning of ‘firm surveillance’ and 
even that the phrase was introduced as a substitute for agreement on a more precise reform 
of the exchange rate system. Those (notably U.S. officials) who sought a flexible system in 
which exchange rates could adjust freely in response to market forces saw surveillance as a 
means of discouraging countries from manipulating exchange rates in opposition to market 
pressures. Those (notably French officials) who sought greater stability in exchange rates 
saw it as a means of encouraging countries to adopt economic policies that would ensure 
such stability. Both sides recognized that the principles and procedures of surveillance would 
have to be worked out gradually through experience” (Boughton 2001: 68). 
In April 1976, the Board of Governors of the IMF agreed to the proposed changes. The 
second amendment of the Articles of Agreement came into force two years later, in April 
1978. Ever since, the IMF has conducted multilateral surveillance much like the OECD 
and, to date, the European Union does. 
The 1976 treaty reform characterizes the transition form a rule-based to a discretionary in-
ternational monetary system. States can choose between fixed or floating exchange rates or 
opt for regional currency arrangements (Guitián 1992: 9-10). In such a system, economic 
policy coordination is harder to attain since exchange rate stability does no longer indicate 
prudent domestic policies and there is no simple measure to detect competitive devalua-
tions (“dirty floating”). As a consequence, the scope of multilateral surveillance has been 
broadened over the years. It has by now become a thorough examination of national eco-
nomic policies. Interface management has given way to the monitoring of domestic poli-
cies. Yet the growing importance of multilateral surveillance has not been paralleled by a 
higher degree of delegation of sovereignty. On the contrary, while the IMF reports on na-
tional policies, it has no power to enforce its recommendations. In practice, multilateral 
surveillance leaves the IMF fairly toothless with members who do not need its financial 
resources (Kahler 1988: 386). Compliance with the Fund’s recommendations remains es-
sentially voluntary (Goddard/Birch 1996: 222). Multilateral surveillance was chosen as a 
compromise procedure to bridge different opinions about the proper functioning of the in-
ternational monetary system and it cannot bind governments. 
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2.3. EU: deliberation as a default option 
The degree to which supposedly power-jealous states pooled and delegated sovereignty 
distinguished the European Union from other international organizations from the begin-
ning. The Treaty of Rome gave a strong mandate to supranational actors. The European 
Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and, later, the European Parliament be-
came involved in the formulation, administration, and legal oversight of European policies. 
While the Commission had the exclusive right to initiate policies, the ECJ held the author-
ity to interpret the Community law. This Community method has proven tremendously ef-
fective in promoting integration. Yet it has come under attack in recent years. First, the 
Community method was not extended to foreign policy or justice and home affairs when 
they were launched to EU policy-making with the Maastricht Treaty. Second, the employ-
ment chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty introduced a potential rival to the Community 
method, which after the March 2000 Lisbon summit was dubbed the Open Method of Co-
ordination. The next few paragraphs show that the introduction of multilateral surveillance 
in employment policy was an answer to different ideas about the proper involvement of the 
EU in this policy field. 
In the aftermath of the Maastricht summit, European integration was in crisis. Danish vot-
ers in 1992 rejected the Treaty in a referendum and the French accepted it by a tiny major-
ity only. At the same time, the European economy turned sore and unemployment rose 
again. There was a widespread notion that integration was too exclusively focused on mar-
ket integration, disregarding unemployment as the most pressing problem. The permissive 
consensus supporting integration was at risk. Thus center-left governments called for a 
European approach to fight unemployment without, however, granting more power to dis-
tant ‘Brussels bureaucrats.’ Thus, at the Copenhagen summit in 1993, the European Coun-
cil instructed the Commission to produce a White Paper. It was asked to spell out a 
strategy for higher growth, competitiveness and employment. The Commission’s report 
became known as the “Delors’ White Book.” 
The next step towards a European employment initiative came with the Essen summit in 
1994. Heads of state and government agreed on a number of non-binding objectives to 
fight unemployment. These included investing in human capital (up-skilling of the work-
force), increasing the employment-intensiveness of growth, reducing non-wage labor costs, 
improving the effectiveness of employment policy by moving from passive to active labor 
market policy as well as supporting groups particularly hard hit by unemployment. How-
ever, the Essen employment procedures were mainly meant to fend-off more ambitious   14
proposals of the ascending social democratic majority in the European Council (Hix/Lord 
1997: 194). They covered up a party-political dispute on the question how to generate em-
ployment growth. 
Due to this policy conflict, none of the objectives was legally enforceable or entailed the 
delegation of sovereignty. The governments most skeptical of a European employment pol-
icy knew that a binding agreement would make for unduly Commission interference in 
domestic policy-making. Accordingly, they fought for a soft law approach. As a result, 
member states were merely urged “to transpose these recommendations in their individual 
policies into a multi-annual program having regard to the specific features of their eco-
nomic and social situation” (European Council 1994). The European Commission and the 
Labor and Social Affairs as well as Economic Financial Affairs Council were asked to 
monitor national developments and report annually to the European Council about pro-
gress. Hence, core elements of the Open Method of Coordination – common objectives, 
national implementation, and surveillance by the Commission and member states – were in 
place already in 1994. Content and form followed from a disagreement in substance and a 
consensus to limit obligation. A soft coordination padded with mutual monitoring served 
both. 
Especially social democratic governments supported a higher EU profile in tackling unem-
ployment during the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the Amsterdam Treaty. Still, 
until early 1997 chances that the negotiations would lead to an agreement were slim as 
conservative governments in Great Britain, France, and Germany opposed even this lim-
ited approach. Only after the elections in the first two countries, which brought New La-
bour and the French socialists to power, an agreement became possible.
6 Finally not even 
the Kohl government was keen on blocking treaty reform for an issue considered of minor 
relevance. It wanted to make sure, though, that any transfer of power to the European 
Commission would be strictly limited. However, even among center-left governments 
there was a disagreement over the EES. Jospin and Blair supported quite different labor 
market policies domestically and both strove to Europeanize those. And while most social 
democratic government principally were in favor of an employment chapter, they insisted 
on the principle of subsidiarity since they were afraid that otherwise the credit for fighting 
unemployment – an electoral asset for center-left parties – would go to the EU (Ladrech 
2003: 119).
7 
                                                           
6 On the importance of party politics for European integration more generally see Manow/ Schäfer/Zorn 
(2004). 
7 For more details on the position of social democratic governments see Lightfoot (2003).   15
In the end, employment became part of the Amsterdam Treaty. The disagreement in sub-
stance – how to fight unemployment and whether this would require EU competencies – 
created the soft coordination of the European Employment Strategy. The EES was not a 
tool chosen primarily because it was the most promising means to an end but rather be-
cause it facilitated a compromise between supporters and opponents of the employment 
chapter. Agreement rested on two conditions: there would neither be a transfer of compe-
tencies to the European level nor an increase in spending (Goetschy 1999: 125). While the 
supporters could claim to have successfully fought for an employment chapter, its oppo-
nents made sure it remained largely toothless. 
Since the amended treaty would only be ratified in 1999, governments decided to have a 
special summit on employment in 1997. Because it took place in Luxembourg, the Euro-
pean Employment Strategy was baptized “Luxembourg process.” Consciously modeled on 
the Maastricht convergence process, the employment chapter of the Amsterdam Treaty in-
troduced the following cycle of multilateral surveillance: 
(1)  every year, members states would agree on Employment Guidelines specifying com-
mon objectives; 
(2)  each governments would draw up a National Employment Action Plan (NAP) detail-
ing the strategy of how it would seek to achieve these goals; 
(3)  based on a Commission draft, the Council and the Commission would publish the 
Joint Employment Report which would assess and evaluate member states’ NAPs as 
well as their policies; 
(4)  the European Council would annually review this reports and, if appropriate,  modify 
the Guidelines. 
While this procedure mimicked the convergence program, it refrained from introducing 
sanctions. The Luxembourg process tried to compensate for its limited legal weight by put-
ting a stronger emphasis on the commitment made by governments. They were asked to 
draw up a NAP to detail their approach to fighting unemployment. This document could be 
used thereafter to compare word and action. This Commission hoped to gain influence on 
national policies by reminding reluctant governments on their prior commitment. 
However, at the Luxembourg summit, no consensus could be reached on defining a target 
for unemployment as a counterpart to those concerning public deficits, inflation, and debts 
(Rodrigues 2001: 4). The Commission proposed a more rigorous set of employment guide-
lines and urged the member states to accept clearly specified quantitative targets but could 
not overcome their resistance. Reducing employment policies to a voluntary opportunity   16
for learning without obligatory targets facilitated support for it. In the end, such diverse 
governments as those led by Jospin, Blair, Aznar and Kohl were able to accede to the thus 
conceived Employment Strategy. In sum, the turn towards soft law in employment policy 
ensured that the negotiations were not deadlocked over substantive disagreements. 
The goals of European integration have become more contested in recent years. While cen-
trist parties generally remain in favor of integration, the implicit consensus over which 
policies can and should be handled jointly has vanished. As Hooghe/Marks/Wilson (2004) 
show, there is a clear left-right division on policies that regulate capitalism: The left sup-
ports European competencies for environment, cohesion, and employment policies; the 
right opposes them. The OMC was a social democratic attempt to craft a social policy 
mandate onto the existing economic constitution. At the Lisbon summit in March 2000, 
center-left coalitions governed in eleven countries. They seized the opportunity to turn the 
EES into a general governance tool called the Open Method of Coordination 
(Trubek/Mosher 2003; Wincott 2003). This allegedly new method was thereafter extended 
to a whole range of policies (e.g. social inclusion, research and development, pensions) 
where a treaty base was lacking but governments still sought joint initiatives. As the OMC 
proliferated, the European Council devised more ambitious aims for the EU. The so-called 
Lisbon Strategy announced the goal to make the EU the world’s most dynamic and com-
petitive economy with full employment and more and better jobs (European Council 
2000). Yet, neither the goals nor the procedures were legally binding; they instead rested 
on voluntary compliance. Growing membership increases the interest heterogeneity with 
the European Union and makes substantive agreements more unlikely. As a consequence, 
governments could even more often than in the past rely on soft law because in this way 
they can “agree to disagree.” Yet we should not conceive of these compromises a function-
ally necessary. They are an answer to policy conflicts and not primarily adopted to solve 
problems. 
 
2.4. The Virtues of Soft Law 
All three organizations introduced soft law procedures at times when their member states 
could not agree on the purpose of the organizations. In the OEEC, the survival of the or-
ganization itself was at stake since different groups of governments favored very different 
forms of cooperation. Only diminishing the obligations that came with membership made 
the transformation of the OEEC into the OECD possible. As there were conflicting ideas 
about the purpose of the new organization, the member states did not agree on delegating   17
authority. The OECD could not rely on binding law any longer but became an expert or-
ganization and “ideational artist” geared towards policy advice (Marcussen 2004). In a 
similar vein, the Keynesian consensus that had existed during the Bretton Woods negotia-
tions dissolved in the 1970s. IMF members held opposing views on how the international 
monetary system would function best. The Europeans generally favored fixed par values, 
while the United States preferred floating exchange rates. Since there is no easy compro-
mise between these two positions, the negotiations over the reform of the Articles of 
Agreement lasted several years. The final text consciously employed an imprecise lan-
guage and asked member states to endeavor to support a “stable system of exchange rates.” 
However, it was neither clear what kind of behavior would indicate non-compliance nor 
were there any consequences but appeals to national governments. In contrast to a rule-
based system, the IMF certainly lost influence. Finally, the European Union opted for soft 
law in employment policy because in the first half of the nineties there was no agreement 
on which policies would be most appropriate to fight unemployment or on the need for EU 
competencies. There was a party-political conflict between social democratic and conser-
vative governments but also among center-left parties. Competing national opinions on la-
bor market policies did not translate without difficulty into joint European policies. The 
European Employment Strategy became possible after its ambitions and the supranational 
involvement had been scaled down considerably. Once governments were certain that the 
EU could not force them to adopt policies against their will, they consented to the em-
ployment chapter. In sum, international organizations do not introduce multilateral surveil-
lance because of its proven effectiveness but rather because no substantial agreement is 
obtainable. 
 
3.  Conclusion 
Hug and König (2002) use the two-level game concept to explain why the ratification of 
the Amsterdam Treaty went smoothly. Negotiating governments had learned from the 
Maastricht experience that domestically controversial issues endanger ratification. As a 
consequence, if there was substantial disagreement among the negotiators on policy areas, 
issues were removed from the Commission draft during the Intergovernmental Conference. 
At the end of this process of “issue subtraction” only those topics entered the Amsterdam 
Treaty that had aroused little controversy. However, this paper argues that there is another 
possibility than removing issues, namely, scaling down their impact. That is what hap-
pened in employment policy. Rather than subtracting the employment chapter as a whole,   18
governments watered it down. At the end, everyone was able to agree to a non-binding ap-
peal to good will. 
More generally, Chayes and Chayes (1993: 184) point out that negotiations do not neces-
sarily fail because of different preferences of the negotiators. There are ample ways to 
compromise and, over the years, we have seen many of those in the European Union. 
Techniques to resolve deadlock include opt-outs or a long phasing-in of policies. Another 
possibility is to define only general goals and leave the exact meaning unspecified. It will 
then be defined through the practical application. Governments did not know in detail what 
effects OECD Economic Surveys, IMF Article IV Consultations, or the European Em-
ployment Strategy were going to have. However, they were sure that soft law would not 
infringe their room for maneuver too strongly. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty provided a number of opt-outs in social policy and European 
Monetary Union, differentiated integration has been used a number of times to resolve 
deadlock. With the Amsterdam Treaty and later the OMC this tool has become less rele-
vant. It is no longer variable geometry that facilitates compromises but variable contents. If 
agreements are not binding, it is much easier even for opposing governments to support 
them. 
Theoretical accounts of European integration see supranational rules and the degree of 
delegation as a response to mounting societal pressure for common rules, a way to handle 
incomplete contracting or a means to achieve efficient bargaining outcomes. Yet they have 
more difficulties in answering why governments would choose soft law since it does not 
conform to any of these expectations. The principal-agent framework suggests that delega-
tion is rational if the reduction in transaction-costs outweighs agency losses, if future de-
fection is likely, and if policy conflicts among the negotiators are low. Inverting this logic 
we can argue that governments shy away from delegation if they fear that supranational 
agents misuse their autonomy or if there is a deep disagreement. In these cases cooperation 
does not necessarily end but it may take the form of soft law. Introducing multilateral sur-
veillance is but one technique to avoid the failure of international negotiations. Taking this 
insight into account would prevent some of the writing on the Open Method of Coordina-
tion to make heroic assumptions on the reason why it has become so popular among gov-
ernments in recent years.   19
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